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Articles
The Puzzle of Comment j
DAVID G. OWEN*
A curious puzzle lies at the heart of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the fountainhead of modern products liability law.'
That puzzle is this: section 402A, crafted by Dean William Prosser,
generated the expansive, plaintiff-friendly doctrine of strict liability in
tort for the sale of products that are defective in any of three
fundamentally different ways-in manufacturing, warnings, or design.
Yet a sentence in one comment to section 402A, comment j, can be read
quite literally to mean that the provision of a warning-any type of
warning, no matter how deficient-eliminates the manufacturer's duty of
safe design.' If this be true, as a number of courts have held, then section
402A is a much weaker doctrine than generally believed. In a single
sentence of a single comment to a single section of the Restatement,
Dean Prosser may have stripped the doctrine of strict products liability in
tort of much of its intrinsic power.
In attempting to ascertain the proper relationship between a
manufacturer's duty to warn and its duty of safe design, most courts and
commentators have side-stepped the problem raised by the enigmatic
sentence of comment j simply by ignoring it. And the commentators who
have studied the comment most closely, including the Reporters for the
Third Restatement of Torts, have interpreted it as meaning, perversely,
that a manufacturer's warnings somehow cancel out its duty of safe
* Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Thanks to John
Kassel for helping me think through some aspects of this puzzle, and for research assistance to Nikki
Lee and Tom Andrews. This essay draws from DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 6.2
(ThomsonlWest 2005). 0 2005 David G. Owen and ThomsonlWest.
i. While there now is a Restatement (Third) of Torts on the topic of products liability, the law in
most states still is largely constructed upon section 402A, the most influential section of any
Restatement of the Law on any topic. At the June 8, 1993 meeting of the Consultative Group on the
Products Liability Restatement, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, then Director of the ALI, reported that
section 4o2A had been cited in judicial opinions more often than any other section of any
Restatement. Central puzzles in section 402A thus carry an enduring interest for courts and lawyers
trying to understand this area of the law.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
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design.3 But this interpretation is wrong. In fact, the riddle of comment j
has a key that is quite simple, discoverable from examining the history of
section 402A within the context of the times, that is consistent with the
way products liability law has in fact evolved over the last four decades.
Until now, the curious comment j sentence has remained a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.' No more.
I. THE DISTINCTNESS OF THE PRODUCT DEFECT CONCEPTS
In products liability litigation, both the Second and Third
Restatements of Torts base liability on the concept of product defect.
Section 402A of the Second Restatement provides liability for selling a
product in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous"5 and section I
of the Third Restatement provides liability for selling "a defective
product." 6  Notwithstanding this common grounding, the two
Restatements treat the defect concept entirely differently.
When Dean Prosser crafted section 402A of the Second
Restatement in the late 195os and early i96os, products liability law was
in its infancy.' At that very early stage in the development of this branch
of law, the defect concept was only roughly understood and conceived of
quite naively as a unitary concept: products were either too dangerous
(defective) or safe enough (nondefective). As courts in the i96os and
197os applied the principles of section 402A to an ever-widening array of
products in an ever-widening range of contexts, the disparities among the
various forms of product dangers increasingly revealed themselves. Over
time, courts and commentators came to understand the fundamental
distinctions between three very different forms of product defect: (i)
manufacturing flaws -unintended physical irregularities that occur
during the production process;9 (2) design inadequacies -hazards lurking
in a product's engineering or scientific conception that may reasonably
be avoided by a different design or formula;"0 and (3) insufficient
warnings of danger and instructions on safe use-the absence of
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1 (1998); James A. Henderson &
Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 689
(i998); Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1294-95 (994); George Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 1O CARDOZO L. REV.
2301, 2303 (1989).
4. Comment j in the year 2004 may be less inscrutable than was Russia in the late 193os, but
Winston Churchill's inimitable characterization nevertheless seems apt.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998).
7. See I DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTs LIABILrrY 9 5:2, 5:3 (3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY].
8. See id. H 5:3, 5:5.
9. See id. ch. 7.
Io. See id. ch. 8.
[Vol. 55:1377
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information needed by users to avoid product hazards." In the decades
since section 402A first roughly sketched a general doctrine of strict
products liability in tort, the need to accord separate treatment to the
liability issues distinctive to these very different defect contexts has
become a well-accepted axiom. Today, the independent existence of each
of these three separate types of defects is a fundamental premise of
American products liability law.'2
Section 402A of the Second Restatement provided a single rule of
liability for the sale of defective products. 3 Because the Third
Restatement in section I begins quite similarly in providing that a seller
of a "defective product" is subject to liability for resulting harm, ' 4 it
might, at first glance, appear to restate the Second Restatement's no-
fault doctrine of "strict liability" that has dominated products liability
doctrine since the i96os. But section 2 of the Third Restatement radically
departs from section 402A by splintering the defect notion into the three
separate forms of defect-defects in manufacture,'5  design,'6  and
instructions or warnings' 7-each with separate doctrine of its own. 8 By so
trifurcating defectiveness, section 2 affords separate vessels for separate
liability standards. Section 2(a) defines liability for manufacturing defects
in terms of departure-from-intended-design, whereas sections 2(b) and
(c) define liability for design and warnings defects in the foreseeable risk-
utility terms of fault-based liability. 9 Liability in section 2 of the new
i i. See id. ch. 9. Misrepresentation, the fourth principal basis of products liability, is not generally
classified as a product "defect."
12. See generally Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713 (7 th Cit. 2001); McLennan v. Am.
Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cit. 2001); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (Conn.
2ooi); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2ooo). The universality of this
principle is noted in the first Reporters' Note to the first comment to the first section of the Third
Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THa) OF TORTS: PROD. LiAB. §§ I cmt. a, note 1, 2 cmt. a (1998).
Early in the development of modem products liability theory, some theorists conceived of the
duty to warn as a subcategory of the duty to design. For remnants of this conceptualization, see for
example Chellman v. Saab-Scania AB, 637 A.2d 148, 150 (N.H. 1993) (stating that "[t]he duty to warn
is part of the general duty to design, manufacture and sell products that are reasonably safe"); John W.
Wade, On the Effect in Products Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 734, 740 (983) (stating that "although 'failure to warn' is usually treated as a separate basis for
finding a product actionable, 'failure to warn' cases may be properly viewed as 'defective design'
cases").
13. See I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucrs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 5:3.
14. "One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or
distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998).
15. Id. § 2(a).
16. Id. § 2(b).
17. Id. § 2(c).
is. See, e.g., Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731, 740 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"design defect claims and failure to warn claims are governed by distinct analyses"); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. a, note 1 (1998).
i9. Notwithstanding the strict-sounding language of "defectiveness" in which the definitions are
cast. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ I cmt. a, 2 cmts. a, c, d, i, m (1998). Note that
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Restatement thus is truly "strict" for manufacturing defects but is based
on negligence for design and warnings defects." The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability is premised upon the substantial
independence of these three forms of defect, not only in the tripartite
division of defectiveness in section 2, but also in the various provisions
governing a product seller's obligations in different contexts.'
While variations among the liability standards may be the most
fundamental distinction between the separate types of defects, other
consequences flow from the particular type of defect alleged and proved.
By way of illustration, the obviousness of a danger in most jurisdictions
precludes as a matter of law a finding of warning,22 but not design,23
defectiveness.24 Further, certain types of evidence may be proper in
proving one type of defect but not another. For example, evidence of
subsequent design changes may be admissible in some states to help
establish a manufacturing defect, whereas such evidence may not be used
to prove a defect in a warning or design case. 5 In addition, some
jurisdictions provide for special defenses tailored to particular types of
defect. 6
In short, the three different types of product defectiveness generate
three separate, independent sets of obligations for product sellers. But
there remains a nettlesome problem, embedded in the comments to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
II. THE COMMENTj PROBLEM
That the three types of defect beget distinct and largely independent
obligations would seem to be so obvious as to be beyond dispute. From
time to time, however, this fundamental principle of products liability
law escapes an unwary court. Typically, the source of this confusion is an
ambiguous sentence in comment j to section 402A of the Second
Restatement which a number of decisions have construed as meaning
the Third Restatement uses sections 1-4 to describe liability rules applicable to products generally and
that it addresses liability standards applicable to special defendants, such as sellers of component parts
(§ 5), prescription drugs (§ 6), food (§ 7), and used products (§ 8), in later sections.
20. See generally David G. Owen, Restating Products Liability Law: Exploding the "Strict"
Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743 (I996).
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6 (1998) (sellers of prescription drugs
and medical devices subject to different standards for manufacturing defects, design defects, and
warnings defects).
22. I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 10:4.
23. Id. § 10.3.
24. See, e.g., Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930,931 (Kan. 2000).
25. See, e.g., Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 868 (N.Y. 1984); Cramer v. Toledo Scale Co., 551
N.Y.S.2d 718,720 (N.Y. App. Div. 199o).
26. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 2000) (applying certain state-of-the-art defenses
only to design dangers); Cacciola v. Selco Balers, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 175, 185-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2OO)
(holding that substantial modification defense may preclude liability for design, but not warning,
defects).
[Vol. 55:1377
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that a manufacturer who warns of danger eludes the duty of safe
design-that warnings trump design. 7
Comment j basically sets forth, noncontroversially, a product seller's
duty to warn of foreseeable hazards.i However, the comment concludes
with the following "unfortunate language: 29 "Where warning is given,
the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a
product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is
not in [a] defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.' 30
This language is indeed "unfortunate" because its ambiguity permits
it to be interpreted in any number of significantly different ways. For
example, it may be read as meaning that any warning, no matter how
inadequate, satisfies the informational obligations addressed in comment
j; or that a warning if adequate satisfies those obligations; or that any
warning, no matter how inadequate, satisfies every duty of whatever type
owed by the seller to the user; or that an adequate warning will satisfy
every duty of whatever type owed by the seller to the user. The proper
interpretation of this sentence, as explained below, is really none of
these, but the much more narrow proposition that the only obligation of
sellers of inherently dangerous products like food, alcohol, tobacco, and
drugs, in addition to supplying them free of impurities, is to warn
consumers of the unavoidable, latent dangers such products foreseeably
may contain. Understanding why this narrow interpretation is correct
requires deconstructing comment j-by reading it in the context of other
27. Parts of this and subsequent sections are drawn from David G. Owen, Warnings Don't Trump
Design: The Rise and Fall of§ 4o2A Comment J, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ADVISORY I (Nov. 2001).
28. Comment j to § 402A provides in full:
j. Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to
its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for example
to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn against them.
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the
population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if
known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the
seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of
the ingredient and the danger. Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly
dangerous for other reasons, warning as to use may be required.
But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which
are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long
period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and
recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example, as are also those of
foods containing such substances as saturated fats, which may over a period of time have a
deleterious effect upon the human heart.
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded;
and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
29. This is the characterization by the Reporters for the Third Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1, note (1998).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
June 2004]
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comments (together with their "legislative history"), considering the
relevant policies, and reviewing related products liability developments
over time.
A. DECONSTRUCTING COMMENT ]
i. Reading Comment] in Context
In attempting to unravel the inscrutable meaning of this clause of
comment j, one needs to read it in context by considering the comments
that precede and follow it (comments i and k) and the narrow subject
matter these comments in fact addressed. In examining this context, it
must be remembered that the Restatement Reporter, Dean William
Prosser, researched and drafted comment ] in the late 195OS and early
i96o to accompany a narrow draft of section 402A of the Second
Restatement limited to defective food and related products-such as
drugs, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco-several years before a general
doctrine of strict liability in tort applying to all products ever saw the
light of day.
A close reading of comments i, j, and k to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 402A, together with their "legislative history," reveals
that these comments were directed exclusively to a narrow set of issues
pertinent to a limited class of products, to wit, the liability (and limits of
liability) of sellers of certain types of products-food, whiskey, cigarettes,
drugs, and similar products that carry unavoidable dangers. While the
titles to comments i ("Unreasonably dangerous") and j ("Directions or
warning") unfortunately suggest that they might have general application
to all products, these comments, together with comment k ("Unavoidably
unsafe products"), in fact are limited to a single narrow class of products
which carry inherent hazards that cannot be designed away.
The premise of each of these three comments is that strict liability
under section 402A does not apply unless a manufacturer has a
reasonable way to eliminate a product's hazards. Based on this premise,
the main point of these particular comments is that the only duties of
manufacturers of food, whiskey, cigarettes, drugs, and similar products
containing generic risks is to warn consumers of the hidden dangers. The
comments thus explain that this limited class of products, accompanied
by proper warnings, are not in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" with respect to the unavoidable dangers inherent in products
of this type.
a. Comment i
Comment i explains why the ALI added the phrase "defective
condition" to modify the "(unreasonably) dangerous" phrase used in an
earlier, preliminary draft of section 402A. The "defective condition"
language was added (at the urging of the ALI Council) to make clear
that the new "strict" liability in tort would not give rise to design liability
[VOL. 55:1377
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for selling products like food, whiskey, and cigarettes that contain
inherent dangers that cannot be eliminated.3' Comment i thus explains
that, while the strict liability principle of section 402A properly applies to
injuries caused by contaminated tobacco, food, and drink, it does not
apply to injuries from the inherent dangers consumers widely know such
products to contain.32
b. Comment]
Comment j, first attached to the 1961 draft of section 402A that
applied only to food and similar products, also discusses and applies only
to dangerous foods, alcoholic beverages, and drugs, products that by
their nature cannot be rendered safe except by warnings. This comment
makes three points. First, continuing the reasoning of comment i,
comment j points out that sellers of food, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, and
similar products widely known to be inherently dangerous are not
generally subject to strict liability for such dangers because consumers
understand that products of these types necessarily include such risks.
Next, comment j notes that sellers of such products do have a duty to
warn consumers of any latent risks of which consumers generally are
unaware. Finally, it recognizes that because there simply is no way other
than by warning that sellers of such products can minimize the inherent
risks, that the only reasonable duty of sellers of this narrow class of
product is to warn consumers of any hidden dangers.33
The premise here is that sellers of generically dangerous products
may trust that users, properly informed of any hidden dangers, will read
and heed any (adequate) warnings and take responsibility for such
inherent risks." Thus, properly interpreted, comment j's concluding
sentence actually means:
Where [adequate] warning [of any hidden dangers] is given, the seller
[of inherently dangerous products like food, drugs, alcoholic
beverages, and cigarettes] may reasonably assume that [the warning]
will be read and heeded [because there is nothing else the seller can do
to avoid the danger]; and [such] a product bearing such a warning,
which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in [a] defective condition,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
Thus, comment j actually addresses only the narrow issue of a
seller's duties with respect to food, tobacco, drugs, alcoholic beverages,
and similar products containing inherent and unavoidable risks that
35. See 38 A.L.I. PRoc. 87-89 (i96i).
32. "Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. i (1965).
33. In addition, of course, to any seller's duties not to sell a product in a contaminated or
physically flawed condition and not to misrepresent a product's safety.
34. Indeed, sellers of such products must trust in the good sense of users, for there is nothing else
to be done.
June 2004]
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cannot be designed away.35 Conversely, comment j does not address how
warnings may affect the duty of safe design for other types of products
whose dangers can reasonably be designed away. 6
c. Comment k
Reiterating the overarching theme of all three comments-that a
limited class of inherently and unavoidably dangerous products should
be exempt from any design obligations under the strict liability rule of
section 402A-comment k explains how, in particular, the principles of
comments i and j apply to prescription drugs. In the context of this
special type of unavoidably dangerous product, comment k reiterates the
dual points that a seller does have a duty to provide proper warnings but
that it is not otherwise liable for any inherent risks that cannot be
designed away.37
In sum, a careful reading of comments i, j, and k makes clear that
they address only the narrow, unavoidable danger issue with respect to
inherently dangerous products like foods, cigarettes, whiskey, and
drugs. 8 Everything in the comments points to their limited applicability,
and nothing39 suggests that they were intended to limit a seller's duty to
design its products safely if there is a reasonable way to do so.'
35. This interpretation of comment j is further supported by its direction that any required
warnings be placed on the product's "container," surely the best place to warn of inherent dangers in
food, drugs, whiskey, and cigarettes, but nonsensical when applied to the vast array of durable
products that come without containers-tools, clothing, power mowers, automobiles, vacuum cleaners,
and punch presses-for which the law requires that warnings against significant hidden dangers be
located in the most appropriate place.
36. Dangers that can reasonably be designed out of products are by definition neither "inherent"
nor "unavoidable."
37. Comment k provides in pertinent part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.... The seller of such
products[, particularly drugs], again with the qualification that they are properly prepared
and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences [from] a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
38. The only examples in comments i-k are, in order: sugar (diabetes), castor oil (used by
Mussolini for torture), whiskey (drunkenness), tobacco (cancer), butter (cholesterol and heart
attacks), eggs (allergies), strawberries (allergies), alcohol (drunkenness), fatty foods (heart attacks),
Pasteur rabies vaccine (allergic reactions), and other drugs and vaccines (side effects).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i-k (1965).
39. Except possibly for the unfortunate generality of their titles, left over from early tentative
drafts of § 4 o2A that applied only to food, and then food, drugs, and bodily use products. Once
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), was decided, Dean Prosser
promptly expanded the black letter of § 402A from food and products for "intimate bodily use" to all
products. In his haste to revise the draft in this manner, as discussed below, Prosser neglected to adapt
most of the comments to their now much broader scope, leaving most of them in the form in which
they had originally been drafted with a much more limited type of product in mind. Had he had more
time, no doubt he would have added a major heading over comments i, j, and k, entitled
"UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODuCrs," and then changed the title of comment k to "Prescription drugs."
40. In short, the comments simply recognize that you can't put a safety device on a stick of butter.
NVo1. 55:1377
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2. Comment j's "Legislative History"
The above contextual interpretation of comment j is confirmed by
an examination of the evolution of section 402A drafts from i961
through 1964, together with the contemporaneous scholarship of Dean
Prosser and certain key Restatement Advisers. Section 402A was
presented to the full American Law Institute three times, beginning with
Tentative Draft No. 6 in I96I. 4' In this draft, section 402A imposed strict
liability in tort upon sellers of "food in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to consumers." In three small paragraphs, a
single comment f (entitled "Unreasonably dangerous") contained the
entire discussion of the issues that in the final published version
eventually spanned three comments-i, j, and k. Although the section
402A black letter spoke only in terms of "food," comment c defined that
word to embrace "all products intended for internal human
consumption," including beverages, candy, chewing gum, chewing
tobacco, snuff, unground coffee beans, and drugs.'
The next year, 1962, in order to embrace these non-food items more
comfortably, the black letter of section 402A was expanded in Tentative
Draft No. 7 to cover, in addition to food, "other products for intimate
bodily use."43 In this draft, the discussions in comment f of the previous
draft (Tentative Draft No. 6) were expanded upon and divided into
comments i, j, and k. In 1964, one year after Justice Traynor's landmark
ruling in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' the black letter of
section 402A was expanded again (in Tentative Draft No. io) 45 to
broaden the applicability of strict liability in tort to the sale of all
products in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer." In this final draft, which Dean Prosser hurriedly rewrote to
accommodate Greenman,46 comments i, j, and k (all three of which
sprang from the comment f that had been written to accompany the
"food" black-letter draft of I96I 47) remained essentially unchanged.
41. Two earlier drafts of § 402A, applying the strict liability principle to food sold in a
"dangerous" condition, were presented respectively to the Advisers and the Council. See Preliminary
Draft No. 6 (Jan. 3, 1958) (submitted to the Advisory Committee), and Council Draft No. 8 (Nov. i,
I96o) (submitted to the Council). Neither draft contains a comment or other discussion addressing the
issues treated in the final comments i, j, and k.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962).
44. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
45. The American Law Institute approved Draft No. io in 1964 and promulgated § 4o2A in final,
published form the next year. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
46. Once Greenman was rendered in i963, Dean Prosser had to scramble to convert § 4o2A from
its prior, narrow coverage to all products. Apart from his many other duties as Torts Restatement
Reporter, dean, and professor, he had to prepare Tentative Draft No. io for circulation, first, to the
Advisers, then to the Council, and finally to the whole ALI membership in time for the May 1964
annual meeting.
47. And which he had fleshed out in the 1962 draft to accommodate other products for intimate
bodily use. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
June 20041
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The contemporaneous scholarship of Dean Prosser and key ALI
Advisers also suggests that comment j was intended only to address the
narrow unavoidable danger issue in foods, drugs, cigarettes, whiskey, and
the like. In his only three products liability articles published after
section 402A was promulgated in I965,49 and in the next edition of his
hornbook, ° Dean Prosser examined the unavoidable danger issue, using
the same examples and reasoning as he had used in comments i, j, and k.
The only salient difference in his treatment of these issues in his
scholarship,5' distinguished from the comments, is that he reverted in his
scholarship to lumping the inherent danger issues all together, under a
single "unavoidable danger" umbrella, as he originally had done in
comment f of Tentative Draft No. 6.52 This suggests that Dean Prosser,
the Reporter for section 402A, intended the narrow, contextual
interpretation of comment j discussed above.
Although it appears that Dean Prosser never directly addressed the
availability of design defect claims under section 402A for failing to
adopt a reasonable alternative design, his writings indicate that he
48. Apart from the addition of a butter example to comment i, and corrections of technical errors
throughout, the comments in Tentative Drafts 7 and to are substantially the same.
There is only sparse discussion of the comment j issue in the Restatement debates, but nothing
there suggests that Dean Prosser or anyone else contemplated that limiting a seller's responsibility to a
duty to warn extended beyond the inherently dangerous food-type products then being considered;
certainly there is no intimation that this limited duty might apply to manufacturers of durable goods
whose dangers may reasonably be designed away. In discussing a manufacturer's duty to warn, Dean
Prosser noted: "It is not correct to say that [the manufacturer] can always avoid liability by giving
reasonable notice." 38 A.L.I. PROC. 68 (I96I). While the meaning of this sentence is somewhat unclear
in its context, Dean Prosser's general remarks do make clear that the last sentence of then comment f
(now comment j) only addressed the kinds of inherent, unavoidable risks dealt with in the food and
drug examples covered by then comment f (now comments i, j, and k).
49. William L. Prosser, Products Liability in Perspective, 5 GONZ. L. Rav. 157 , 164-74 (970)
[hereinafter Prosser, Products Liability in Prespective]; William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the
Consumer in California, 18 HASTNGS L.J. 9-58 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, Strict Liability to the
Consumer]; William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791, 802-48 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel].
50. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 66o (4th ed. I971) [herinafter
PROSSER ON TORTS] (beginning: "The second, and more important, question concerns [whether 402A
should apply to] products that in the present state of human skill and knowledge are unavoidably
dangerous, and cannot be made safe.").
5I. In his last, and least formal article, Dean Prosser explained in fairness terms the rationale for
imposing only a duty to warn (and keep pure) on sellers of food, drugs, and other useful products
containing dangers that cannot be avoided:
You cannot impose strict liability upon a man who sells what appears to be a perfectly
reputable product and is actually extremely beneficial to the human race; you cannot make
him strictly liable because once in a while something goes wrong with it in a way which he
cannot prevent.
Prosser, Products Liability in Perspective, supra note 49, at 166.
52. In all three articles and the hornbook, Prosser states that the question whether § 402A should
apply to unavoidably dangerous products is one of the two or three most important issues on the
proper reach of strict liability, and he organizes this discussion (that the final draft of § 402A had
splintered into comments i, j, and k) under the general heading, Type of Product (in the articles) and
"Unsafe Products" (in the hornbook).
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believed that section 402A properly applies to such cases without regard
to whether the danger was obvious or a warning had been given.53 This
conclusion is confirmed by his observation that the applicability of
section 402A to design defect cases was, with respect to manufacturers,
essentially coincident with negligence law54 which, even prior to section
402A, allowed recovery against manufacturers for negligently omitting
feasible safety devices.5
The scholarship of at least four key ALI Advisers, Professor James,
Deans Keeton and Wade, and Justice Traynor, s6 confirms that the duty of
safe design is largely independent of the duty to warn. A decade prior to
section 402A, Professor James wrote, "the risk that warning will not be
heeded, and the danger likely to ensue if it is not, may be so great as to
call for some safety device or even for abandonment of the process or the
53. In the only edition of his hombook after § 402A was published in 1965, Dean Prosser
addressed the meaning of § 402A's key phrase, "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," noting
that it applies to design defects as well as manufacturing defects. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 50,
§ 99, at 659. One of the cases Prosser cites for this proposition is a safety device case, Pike v. Frank G.
Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229 (Cal. ig7o). Pike explains why strict liability applies to design defects as well
as warnings defects. Id. at 235-37. It also explicitly repudiates the "patent danger rule." Id. at 234 ("the
obviousness of peril is relevant to the manufacturer's defenses, not to the issue of duty."). With the
repudiation of this rule, the defendant's argument that the manufacturer had no duty to design away
dangers which were known to the user became unfounded. Id. at 234-35. The court quotes long
passages from HARPER & JAMES ON TORTS and Noel's Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or
Directions for Use of a Product. Id. at 236. The latter of these treatises concluded, "Under the modem
rule, even though the absence of a particular safety precaution is obvious, there ordinarily would be a
question for the jury as to whether or not a failure to install the device creates an unreasonable risk.".
David Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816,
838 (1962). Pike also relies substantially on Garcia v. Halsett, 82 Cal. Rptr. 42o (Cal. Ct. App. x97o). In
Garcia, the court permitted a design defect claim under strict liability in tort for injuries that the
defendant should have prevented by equipping the machine with an electrical interlock (a "micro
switch") that would have automatically cut off the electricity to the machine. Id. at 422-23. Prosser in
this manner endorsed the applicability of § 402A to design dangers which manufacturers reasonably
can avoid.
54. "Since proper design is a matter of reasonable fitness, the strict liability [under § 4o2A] adds
little or nothing to the negligence on the part of the manufacturer...." PROSSER ON ToRTs, supra note
50, § 99, at 659 n.72.
55. See id. § 96, at 645 ("There is no doubt whatever that the manufacturer is under a duty to use
reasonable care to design a product that is reasonably safe for its intended use, and for other uses
which are foreseeably probable."). Among the cases cited by Prosser in this excerpt is McCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967), which involved a hot water vaporizer that a young child
tipped over by mistake, causing the extremely hot water to scald the child when the unattached lid fell
off. Id. at 493. Because the plastic top easily could have been threaded to permit it to be screwed onto
the top of the hot-water reservoir jar, which would have prevented the injury, the court allowed design
claims against the manufacturer in both negligence and strict liability in tort under § 402A. Id. at 497-
502
56. Professor Fleming James (HARPER & JAMES ON TORTS) of Yale, Dean W. Page Keeton of the
University of Texas, and Dean John W. Wade of Vanderbilt University were prominent tort law
scholars of the day. Justice (later Chief Justice) Roger Traynor authored the principal judicial
authority for § 4 02A in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 9o1 (Cal. 1963),




product if its utility is outweighed by the danger. Surely an automobile
manufacturer would be negligent in marketing cars without brakes, even
if that fact were known to all the world... , " Dean Keeton's scholarship
reveals that products liability scholars at the time were concerned
principally with whether strict liability should be applied to
manufacturing defects and, much more controversially, to inherently
dangerous products such as food, drugs, cosmetics, whiskey, and
tobacco." As for more usual kinds of products, Dean Keeton rejected the
view that a manufacturer's duty of safe design somehow vanishes if the
danger is obvious or the user otherwise (as by a warning) is aware of the
danger." Dean Wade was more explicit, explaining that "a warning will
not always be sufficient."' Chief Justice Traynor, an ALI Adviser for
section 402A as well as the author of Greenman, addressed this issue
head-on in an article published the year section 402A was published. 6'
Observing that the last sentence of comment j was directed at inherently
dangerous products such as poison and cigarettes, products with dangers
that cannot be designed away, he specifically noted that comment j in no
way insulates manufacturers who provide warnings from liability for the
other two types of product defects -manufacturing defects and defects in
design. That is, manufacturers cannot use warnings to shift responsibility
to consumers for these other, independent types of defects.6
57. Fleming James Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44,58 (955).
58. See Page Keeton, Products Liability -Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect,
41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 861-73 (1963); cf. John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, i9 Sw.
L.J. 5, 22 (1965). See generally George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, io
CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2303 (1989).
59. "[T]he proposition that the user's knowledge of a particular hazard involved in the use of a
product should necessarily preclude recovery by him if victimized by that hazard is rejected .... " Page
Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy ofInformation, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398,401 (97o). Dean Keeton
also rejects an economic argument "that a consumer and others who are injured through the use of a
product do not have any right to be secure from harm from dangerous products apart from a right to
be informed or apart from safety legislation." Id. at 401.
60. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 842
(973). Dean Wade provided some examples: "An electrical appliance with uninsulated wires would
not be made duly safe by attaching a warning to look out for the danger of electric shock." and "A
rotary lawn mower, for example, which had no housing to protect a user from the whirling blade
would not be treated as duly safe, despite the obvious character of the danger." Id. at 842-43. He also
notes the similarity of issues in cases where a danger is warned about and where it is obvious. Id.
61. See Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363, 367-73 (1965) (examining the cases on food, drugs, tobacco, and similar products).
"Some dangers are generic to the goods, so that people regard the goods as fit for ordinary use even
with such qualities. The manufacturer would not be liable, under the Restatement test, for harm caused
by generic dangers." Id. at 370 (referring to comment i); see also id. at 367 (§ 402A "would impose no
strict liability for what are classified as 'unavoidably unsafe products"') (citing comment k); id. at 372
(warnings "cannot be used, however, to mask a disclaimer of responsibility that would shift the risk to
the consumer") (referring to comment).
62. See id. at 372:
What is the effect of warning or notice? The Restatement provides: "Where warning is
given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning which is safe for use if the warning is heeded, is not in a defective
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It is evident that the comments to section 402A were not provided as
a complete products liability "code" but in fact addressed only certain
limited aspects of the new doctrine of strict products liability in tort. The
comments do not directly address, outside of the narrow context of
unavoidably dangerous products, the broader issue of the relationship
between the general duties of warnings and safe design. As seen above,
however, contemporaneous scholarship of Dean Prosser and his key ALI
Advisers quite firmly suggests that comments i, j, and k were intended to
address only the narrow issue of the limited manner in which the new
strict liability section applied to unavoidably dangerous products whose
inherent risks cannot be designed away. Their scholarship suggests, and
the comments to section 402A imply, that the new strict liability doctrine
in fact requires manufacturers to physically remove substantial dangers -
even if they are warned about, obvious, or generally known-if there is a
reasonable way to do so.
B. POLICY
It makes good sense to interpret comment j narrowly, as limiting the
duties of sellers of inherently dangerous products like drugs, cigarettes,
and alcoholic beverages to providing products that are uncontaminated
and possess adequate warnings of hidden dangers. Because there is no
way (other than by providing warnings) that manufacturers of such
products can minimize the inherent dangers of such products without
also destroying their utility, there is no good reason in corrective justice
or economics to force manufacturers to insure consumers against risks of
harm they have chosen to accept by using products with inherent risks
they fully understand. But if a product contains substantial risks that can
reasonably be designed away, then a manufacturer that does not do so
should be faulted, in both fairness and economics, for failing to respect
the rights of consumers to reasonable product safety. These fundamental
precepts, explored elsewhere in greater depth,63 support the logic and
fairness of keeping the manufacturer's duty of safe design largely
independent of the duty to warn. To hold that warnings immunize
manufacturers from the duty of safe design (or the duty of safe
manufacture) would unreasonably and regressively subordinate the
interests of consumers to the interests of manufacturers. 64
condition...." [Citing cmt. j.] Example: poison. A warning or notice cannot be used,
however, to mask a disclaimer of responsibility that would shift the risk to the consumer.
Thus, a notice by a manufacturer of soft drinks listing the possible foreign substances that
might be contained in a bottle of its beverage, or a notice by an automobile manufacturer
listing possible difficulties that might be encountered by the user of the car, would not
preclude liability.
63. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427,46o (1993).
64. See, e.g., Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1294-95 (994). Latin explains the problems of interpreting comment jto mean
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A rule that fulfilling one of several independent tort law duties
fulfills them all is quite preposterous. Surely a driver has a duty of
reasonable care to give warning, by tooting the horn, to all pedestrians
endangered by the car's approach, even if they are at fault for being in
the roadway. But a driver also has duties to maintain a proper lookout,
to apply the brakes when appropriate, to operate the car soberly and
with reasonable skill, to obey traffic signals, and not to speed. It it would
be absurd to interpret an ambiguous traffic rule in a manner that would
relieve a driver of all responsibilities to pedestrians so long as the driver,
though violating all the other duties, tooted the horn. Applying this
principle to the products liability situation here at issue, it makes no
sense to relieve a manufacturer of all its other duties-notably its duties
to design and manufacture its products safely -simply because it places a
warning on its products. Such a rule would senselessly allow a
manufacturer of household fans to substitute a warning on the base of
the fan for the fan's protective cage; it would allow a manufacturer of
power mowers to attach a warning on the engine and then remove the
protective housing around the blade; and it would permit a manufacturer
of industrial machinery a simple but completely unsatisfactory means to
avoid its basic duty to equip its machines with simple guards and electric
interlocks when such safety devices are reasonably demanded in the
circumstances to avoid substantial harm.
C. THE EVOLVING PRODUCTS LIABILITY JURISPRUDENCE
Comment J, as previously explained, addresses the narrow issue of
how section 402A allocates responsibility for harm caused by
unavoidable dangers inherent in a narrow class of products. But even in
the unlikely event that comment j was intended to make warnings a
that warnings trump a manufacturer's duty of safe design:
[T]he comment j presumption is unrealistic from a behavioral perspective, inefficient from
an accident-prevention perspective, and inequitable from a normative perspective....
Good product warnings may be useful, indeed necessary, in many accident-prevention
settings but their value is inherently limited and they consequently should not be treated as
legally acceptable alternatives to safer product designs and marketing strategies.
Id.; see also James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 4 o2A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1538 (1992) ("Product warnings cannot bear
the full burden of ensuring that products will be used safely. If a sensible design alternative can
significantly reduce risk, the law will demand that the manufacturer design out the risk rather than
merely warn against it."); I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTs LIABILITY, supra note 7, §§ 10:3, 10:5.
The issue was debated by Professors Jerry J. Phillips and Richard C. Ausness. See Jerry J.
Phillips, Products Liability: Beyond Warnings, 26 N. Ky. L. REV. 595, 6o2 (1999) ("It seems too late...
to return to an unbridled doctrine of laissez faire or caveat emptor, in the modern-day of complex
products, advertising blandishments, and clearly foreseeable human frailty."); see also Kenneth Ian
Weissman, A "Comment J" Parry to Howard Latin's "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 70 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 629 (1996); cf. Richard C. Ausness, When Warnings Alone Won't
Do: A Reply to Professor Phillips, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 627, 646 (1999) (Professor Phillips "rightly
criticizes" comment j, but the Third Restatement's approach in comment I to § 2 goes too far the other
way).
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general shield against the duty of safe design, such an approach contrasts
starkly with developments in products liability law over the past half
century. When Dean Prosser researched and initially drafted comment j
in 1959 and I96O, products liability law was still dominated by many
strictures from the early I9oos: liability was rarely imposed for a
manufacturer's conscious design choices;65 the patent danger doctrine still
reigned supreme in limiting a manufacturer's design responsibility to
only latent dangers;66 consumer expectations were the only gauge of strict
products liability (in warranty and, later, under section 402A);
67
consumer carelessness in any degree, even in the face of an eregiously
dangerous product design, served to bar recovery altogether; and the
intended use doctrine barred liability for most forms of consumer misuse
("abnormal use"), including the failure to follow a seller's instructions,
on the ground that it superseded the manufacturer's responsibility.69 Yet,
soon after section 402A was published (together with its comments,
including comment j) in 1965, the law took several sharp turns the other
way. By the i97os, courts began with a gusto to apply judicial oversight
to manufacturer design choices;70 the patent danger doctrine began a
precipitous decline into virtual extinction;7' the risk-utility standard
began to swallow up the consumer expectation test for evaluating the
safety of a product's design;72 the total bar for user carelessness was
rapidly giving way to damages apportionment based on comparative
fault;7 and the scope of a manufacturer's responsibility for product safety
was widening broadly from intended uses to all foreseeable uses.74
In the twenty-first century, the most sensible way to interpret the
ambiguous last sentence of comment j is according to its original intent -
that it applies only to the narrow category of inherently dangerous
products with unavoidable dangers like food, drugs, alcoholic beverages,
and tobacco. If for some reason a court feels impelled to interpret this
sentence more broadly, as applicable to all types of products, then the
sentence should be interpreted as meaning nothing more than that a
manufacturer may fulfill its informational obligations to consumers by
providing adequate warnings and instructions.75 According greater
65. See I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 8:1.
66. See id. § 10:2.
67. See I id. 99 5:6, 8:3.
68. See 2 id. § 14:2.
69. See 2 id. § 14:4; PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 50, § 102, at 669; William Prosser, supra note 49,
at 824-26 (1966).
70. See I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 8:1.
71. See 1 id. § IO:l.
72. See Iid. §§ 5:6,5:7,8:2-:8.
73. See 2 id. § 15:1-9.
74. See 2 id. § 14:4.
75. See, e.g., Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 28 (ISt Cir. 1997) (restricting comment j to cases
involving only duty to warn); see also Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1331, 1332-33
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import to comment j, as meaning that a warning cancels the fundamental
duty of manufacturers of ordinary products to take reasonable steps to
design away serious hazards, would elevate consumer responsibility for
accidents to the lofty, archaic position it has not occupied for almost half
a century,76 and it would revive a host of discredited doctrines that long
ago were properly put to rest."7
D. PRESENT STATUS OF COMMENTj
With the exception of a handful of misguided decisions that have
misinterpreted comment j as negating the general duty of safe design,
78
the vast majority of courts, some rejecting comment j explicitly on this
point,79 hold that the separate forms of defect give rise to separate
(Colo. 1986) (Quinn, C.J., dissenting); Evridge v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 685 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tenn.
1985); cf. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 941-42 (Kan. 2000). Ironically, in Delaney, the
defendant proposed this interpretation but it was rejected by the court.
76. Imposing absolute responsibility on consumers ignores real-world limitations on human
cognition:
The Comment j presumption embodies the behavioral assumption that "reasonable" users
can be expected to receive, correctly interpret, and obey every comprehensible warning
accompanying every product they use or encounter. Yet, people are exposed each day to
innumerable risks created by appliances that may malfunction or be mishandled; by
potentially toxic pollutants, food additives, and other chemical substances; by cosmetics,
drugs, and cleansing agents that may be improperly applied and are inherently dangerous
for some sensitive individuals; by machine tools, presses, and other industrial or
occupational equipment; and by hazardous transportation and recreation devices. Indeed,
almost all products present substantial risks if improperly manufactured, designed, or used.
People would have to read, understand, remember, and follow innumerable product
warnings to protect themselves from all product-related risks they may confront.
Latin, supra note 64, at 12o6 (citations ommitted) (cognitive theory shows that warnings should only
be used to supplement reasonable designs, not to substitute therefore); see also RESTATEMENT (TMRD)
OF TORTS: PROn. LtAB. § 2 cmt. 1, note (1998); Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings
in Products Liability: Design Defect Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 5o6 (1976).
77. Defense lawyers, who are quite happy to try to revive the old defendant-protective rules,
argue that comment j should be interpreted to mean that a manufacturer which provides a warning
should be relieved of its duty of safe design. See, e.g., Stephen G. Morrison, Products Liability:
Warning vs. Design in Products Litigation: Third Time's Not Always a Charm, iO KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 86, 86 (2000); V. Schwartz, See No Evil, Hear No Evil: When Clear and Adequate Warnings Do
Not Prevent the Imposition of Product Liability, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 47, 59-6o (1999). Yet even Mr.
Schwartz is reluctant to endorse this extreme position. Id. (recognizing the Third Restatement's
"legitimate concern" that people may not in fact read and heed all warnings, and noting the possibility
that "courts could 'over-read' Comment j... to mean that a manufacturer who warns about a risk is
not liable" -giving example of power lawnmower, which carries warning to stay away from unguarded
blade, as situation where warning would not protect manufacturer from duty to add guard).
78. Interpreting comment j to mean that a warning eliminates the manufacturer's duty to provide
a safe design. See, e.g., Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co., 79 F-3d i22i, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 527 A.2d 1337, i341-42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); Freas v. Prater
Constr. Corp., 573 N.E.2d 27, 31-32 (Ohio 1991); Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 543 S.E.2d 264, 269 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 585 S.E.2d 272 (S.C. 2003); cf. Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
447 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that whether user's ignoring warning was sole proximate
cause is a jury issue, based largely upon its foreseeability).
79. Until recently, most courts basically ignored the offending language of comment j,
presumably because they could not believe that it says anything serious about the relationship between
warnings and design for most products. The Third Restatement's explicit rejection of this aspect of the
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obligations that may independently support a products liability claim."
Thus, except in certain limited contexts," it is abundantly clear that a
manufacturer is subject to liability for a product's manufacturing defects,
no matter how clear the product's warnings or how perfect its design;8'
for warning defects, no matter how perfect the product's manufacture or
how impeccable its design;" and for design defects, no matter the
precision of its manufacture or the abundance of its warnings."' This
Second Restatement's comment j, however, focused courts and lawyers specifically on this point and
served, ironically, to revivify the argument that warnings trump design.
Recent cases explicitly rejecting the warnings-trump-design interpretation of comment j include
Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Delaney, 999 P.2d at 942 (Kan. 2000)
("just because there is a warning on a piece of equipment, the warning does not prevent the equipment
from being dangerous"); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335-37 (Tex. 1998);
see also Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Iowa 1999) (dictum critical of cmt.
j).
8o. Even critics of the Third Restatement's rejection of the warnings-trump-design approach
acknowledge that the Third Restatement position is widely embraced by the courts. See, e.g., Ausness,
supra note 64, at 638 (i99).
81. As with pharmaceutical drugs containing unavoidable dangers, where warnings normally are
the only way to eliminate the risk. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
82. See, e.g., Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3 d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2002) ("'[Aldequate warnings
will not render a product with a manufacturing defect non-defective,' regardless of whether
compliance with the warning would have rendered the product safe."); Glover v. BIC Corp., 987 F.2d
1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[A] product with a manufacturing defect.., cannot be made 'non-
defective' simply by placing a warning on the product."); Falada v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 642 N.W.2d 247,
251 (Iowa 2002) ("[Djefective design and defective workmanship are separate concepts.").
83. See, e.g., Hiner v. Deer & Co., Inc., 34o F.3 d II9
o
, 1193 (IOth Cir. 2003) ("A product, though
perfectly designed and manufactured, may be defective if not accompanied by adequate warnings of its
dangerous characteristics." (quoting Meyerhoff v. Michelin Tire Corp., 70 F.3d 1175, 1181 (Ioth Cir.
1995))); Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 261 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Even if a product is not
defectively designed or constructed, a manufacturer 'may still have a duty to warn consumers about
any characteristic of the product that unreasonably may cause damage."' (quoting Greneir v. Med.
Eng'g Corp., 243 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 2001))); Lewis v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 65 P.3d 245, 245 (Nev.
2003) ("'Strict liability may be imposed even though the product is faultlessly made if it was
unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of the user without suitable and adequate
warning concerning safe and proper use."' (quoting Outboard Marine Cop. v. Schupbach, 561 P.2d
450, 455 (Nev. 1977))); Hanus v. Texas Utils. Co., 71 S.W.3d 874, 879 (Tex. App. 2002) ("Texas law
clearly provides that a lack of adequate warnings or instructions can render an otherwise adequate
product unreasonably dangerous."); Wilkinson v. Duff, 575 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 2002) ("A failure to
warn cause of action 'covers situations when a product may be safe as designed and manufactured, but
which becomes defective because of the failure to warn of dangers which may be present when the
product is used in a particular manner."' (quoting Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 3o7 S.E.2d 6o3, 6o9
(W. Va. 1983))).
84. See, e.g., White v. ABCO Eng'g Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 305-06 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
notwithstanding clearly adequate warnings, conveyor manufacturer was subject to liability for failing
to provide side guarding); Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Crow v.
Manitex, Inc., 55o N.W.2d 175 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (holding manufacturer of improperly used crane,
contrary to adequate warnings and instructions that would have prevented accident if heeded, subject
to liability for failing to design crane so as to prevent the accident); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d
930, 942 (Kan. 2000) ("[J]ust because there is a warning on a piece of equipment does not prevent the
equipment from being dangerous."); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1978) ("If a
slight change in design would prevent serious, perhaps fatal, injury, the designer may not avoid liability
by simply warning of the possible injury. We think that in such a case the burden to prevent needless
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latter point is the most significant, because of the lingering, perverse
effects of comment j's long tentacles in a number of jurisdictions.
"Decisively" repudiating the "primitive" interpretation of comment j
that would accord warnings the power to override a manufacturer's
design responsibilities," the Third Restatement declares in no uncertain
terms that the law does not permit a manufacturer to hide behind a
warning in an attempt to insulate itself from its independent duty of safe
design:
In general, when a safer design can reasonably be implemented and
risks can reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the safer
design is required over a warning that leaves a significant residuum of
such risks.... Warnings are not.., a substitute for the provision of a
reasonably safe design.
The courts have quite colorfully expressed the same idea. For
example, the Michigan Supreme Court has observed that "[a] warning in
not a Band Aid to cover a gaping wound, and a product is not safe simply
injury is best placed on the designer or manufacturer rather than on the individual user of a
product."); Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Mich. 1992) ("A
warning is not a Band-Aid to cover a gaping wound, and a product is not safe simply because it carries
a warning."); Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc. 8o8 P.2d 522, 525 (Nev. 1995) ("[A] warning is not an adequate
replacement when a safety device will eliminate the need for the warning."); Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 715 A.2d 967, 977 (N.J. 1998); Evridge v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 685 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tenn.
1985) (interpreting comment j to allow simultaneous warnings and design claims). For early
recognition that a manufacturer has a duty of safe design independent of any warnings, See, e.g.,
James, Products Liability (pt. 1), 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 49, 58-59 (1955).
85. To the extent that comment j retains any beneficial vitality in the modem world, it is as a
source of consumer protection on an entirely separate issue. Indeed, most courts addressing the last
paragraph of comment j have applied it in a consumer-friendly way, ruling in cases where adequate
warnings are not provided that comment j supports a presumption favoring consumers-that, had the
manufacturer provided an adequate warning, the plaintiff (or someone acting on his or her behalf)
would have read and heeded it. This widely adopted "heeding presumption" is used to satisfy the
consumer's burden of proof on cause in fact. See, e.g., Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 719 (N.J.
1993). After Coffrnan, a manufacturer that had warned of a danger asked the New Jersey court to
apply comment j in its favor to bar the plaintiff's design defect claim. The court would not allow this
nonsense: "Allowing such a warning to defeat a design-defect claim .... would frustrate the
imposition of liability when a product's design fails to take into account an injured party's objectively
forseeable misuse of the product." Lewis, 715 A.2d at 977. On this use of the heeding presumption, see
I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 12:6. On the heeding presumption, see
DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 11.4 (Thompson/West 2005).
86. The Restatement Reporters frequently have castigated this interpretation of comment j. For
example, after the completion of the Third Restatement, the Reporters commented on their treatment
of this aspect of comment j: "The Products Restatement rejects this primitive notion decisively."
James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, supra note 3, at 689.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. 1 (1998); see also Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 3, at 689; Aaron D. Twerski, In Defense of the Products Liability Restatement: Part 1, 8 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 29 (1998) ("[C]omment j took the position that a product whose dangers are
warned against, is not defective. We took the position in section 2 comment I of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts that one cannot warn one's way out of a defective design case. If there is a reasonable
design which would make the product safer, the mere fact that one warned against it does not insulate
the seller from liability.... We vehemently disagree with the Second Restatement.").
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because it contains a warning. "" And the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that: "It is thus not
correct that a manufacturer may... merely slap a warning onto its
dangerous product, and absolve itself of any obligation to do more."
89
More succinctly, warnings do not trump design.
III. OVERLAP OF SAFETY OBLIGATIONS
A. THE PROPER ROLE OF WARNINGS IN DESIGN DEFECT DETERMINATIONS
While the three forms of defect generate independent safety
obligations, such that the satisfaction of one obligation does not ipso
facto satisfy the others, fulfilling one duty sometimes helps to satisfy
another. This overlap of safety responsibilities is clearest in the area of
design and warnings. The safer a manufacturer designs its products, the
fewer dangers there will be about which to warn. As seen above,
however, the issue usually is posed the other way: how may a warning
affect a manufacturer's duty of safe design? Although warnings will only
rarely satisfy a manufacturer's duty of safe design, as previously
discussed, warnings sometimes are the only practical way to reduce a
risk, particularly in the case of pharmaceutical drugs and other chemical
and inherently toxic products.' °
For example, a furniture polish that is very harmful if swallowed by
young children would clearly be defective if sold without adequate
warnings of the danger.' Assuming there is no way to change the
chemical formulation of the polish to reduce the risk without sacrificing
its effectiveness, a manufacturer who warns of such an unavoidable
hazard might also be seen as having thereby satisfied any design
obligations as well. In truth, however, such a manufacturer has no
relevant duty of safe design because there is no duty to do the
impossible, to design away an unavoidable risk.92 So such cases are
properly viewed as involving purely a duty to warn and not a duty to
design away a danger inherent in the product.
Because warnings and instructions may in fact serve to reduce design
hazards, at least to some extent, the provision of such information may
have some bearing on design defectiveness.' Just as the obviousness of a
hazard reduces the likelihood of resulting harm, so, too, do warnings and
instructions.94 Thus, because warnings reduce the risk of injury from
88. Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.w.2d 208, 216 (Mich. 1992).
89. Rogers, 144 F.3d at 844.
90. This is particularly so in the case of many generic product risks, as discussed in comment j. See
I MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODuCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, §§ 10:i, 10:9.
91. See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 3o8 F.2d 79, 81-86 (4th Cir. 1962).
92. 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § 10:4.
93. Id. § 9:1.
94 See OWEN, supra note 85, § 9.1.
June 2004]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
design hazards, the presence of a warning is one factor-sometimes an
important one -to be balanced in the calculus of considerations involved
in a determination of design defectiveness. Stated otherwise, in balancing
the risk factors relevant to design defectiveness, a trier of fact should
consider among other factors whether the design hazard was obvious,
warned about, or generally known.95
B. COMPATIBILITY OF SEPARATE DEFECT CLAIMS
While the three types of defect are conceptually distinct, separate
claims for each often are compatible. Thus, in an appropriate case, the
plaintiff may claim and attempt to prove that a product was defective
according to two, or, albeit infrequently, all three different types of
defect.96 Stated otherwise, the different types of defect claims are not
intrinsically exclusive.97 Indeed, design and warning defect claims with
respect to the same danger are quite commonly asserted and allowed in
cases in which a manufacturer allegedly failed to warn of a significant
hidden danger that reasonably could have been designed away. 9 For
example, an SUV that rolls over too easily on particular steering
maneuvers may be defective in design because its center of gravity is too
high and its track width too narrow, and it may also be defective because
of the absence of a warning of this tendency. 9 And while manufacturing
defect claims usually stand on their own, they may be combined with
design and even warnings claims on appropriate facts. So, if an
occasional flashcube may explode when defectively manufactured, the
seller may have a duty to warn of this tendancy." Sometimes the
95. 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 7, § Io:2. The Third Restatement
makes this point in describing the "broad range of factors" that may be relevant to the defectiveness of
a product's design, including "the magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the
instructions and warnings accompanying the product, and the nature and strength of consumer
expectations regarding the product." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (I998).
96. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owen-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 81o P.2d 549, 553 n.7 (Cal. i99i) ("In
most instances, as here, the plaintiff alleges both design and warning defects."). However, the facts of a
particular case often preclude the assertion of particular defect claims. See, e.g., Dierks v. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 230, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (where plaintiff tried auto roll-over case as
a design case, claiming that the roof collapsed too easily, trial court properly refused to instruct jury on
manufacturing defect claim: "A defect in manufacture is, of course, quite different from a defect in
design.").
97. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 878 n.i5 (Alaska 1979)
("Manufacturing defects and design errors are not mutually exclusive."); see also Colt Indus.
Operation Corp. v. Frank W. Murphy Mfg., Inc., 822 P.2d 925, 930 (Alaska i991).
98. See Anderson, 81o P.2d at 553 n.7 ("In most instances, as here, the plaintiff alleges both design
and warning defects."); Evridge v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 685 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tenn. 1985) (allowing
simultaneous warnings and design claims).
99. See, e.g., Bericochea-Cartagena v. Suzuki Motor Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1o9, Ito (D. Puerto Rico
1998) (Suzuki Sidekick); Purvis v. Am. Motors Corp., 538 So. 2d IOI5, ioi8-I9 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(Jeep CJ-5 ).
too. See Maybank v. S.S. Kresge, 266 S.E.2d 409, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. i98o), modified on other
grounds and affd, 273 S.E.2d 68i (N.C. i98I).
1396 [V01. 55:1377
THE PUZZLE OF COMMENTj
evidence is quite unclear as to whether a product was defective in
manufacture or design,"' and a plaintiff with credible evidence should be
allowed to try to make out a case on both.' For example, a product's
wires or cables may be mistakenly crossed during manufacture because
the engineers did not design a sufficient separation to minimize this
production risk. And if the engineers should have foreseen this hazard,
perhaps they should have warned about the resulting danger.
Malfunction cases present another example of how defect theories fairly
may overlap. While the circumstances of a product malfunction
ordinarily may suggest a manufacturing defect, sometimes a design
defect may just as likely be the culprit.1"3
CONCLUSION
From the time section 402A first hit the streets in 1965, the puzzle of
comment j has interfered with an understanding of how the three defect
types relate to one another. Comment j can be read broadly to insulate
manufacturers from their duty of safe design if they warn of dangers in
their products. But this is wrong. Comment j in fact applies only to the
narrow class of inherently dangerous products-notably, food, alcoholic
beverages, tobacco, and pharmaceutical drugs-whose hazards are
unavoidable and, hence, cannot be designed away. Comment j simply
does not address other types of products, and manufacturers of such
other, "normal" products are fully subject to the separate duties of safe
design, safe manufacture, and safe marketing. Conceptually distinct, the
three different types of defect generate obligations that are largely
independent of one another, that do not trespass one upon the other.
This means that manufacturers of products with substantial hazards must
take all reasonable steps to design those hazards away, and that
providing warnings of such hazards will not suffice. Warnings do not
trump the duty of safe design. Rather, it is the other way around.
Interpreting comment j to make the duty of safe design contingent
on a manufacturer's failure to warn is contrary to the original purposes of
section 4o2A; contrary to a fair reading of comment j in context with the
ioi. See, e.g., Stazenski v. Tennant Co., 617 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (worker cut
on sharp edge of industrial sweeper).
io2. See, e.g., Richcreek v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), in which
a car's seat hinge pin, which may have been too short and may have needed welding rather than
pounding into place, may have been pounded into place improperly: "In the case at bar, there appears
a very fine line between design and manufacturing defects under strict liability. To limit a plaintiff to
one theory where no inconsistency exists with others is too restrictive."
IO3. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of
plaintiff's claim, although plaintiff's expert, who concluded that steering failed due to defect in a van's
steering gearbox, was unable to determine whether defect was due to design or manufacture); Morden
v. Cont'l AG, 611 N.W.2d 659, 664 (Wis. 2000) (upholding verdict for plaintiff finding that tire
manufacturer was negligent in design or manufacture of tires). On the malfunction doctrine, see i
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrry, supra note 7, § 7:12.
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other comments; contrary to the understanding of section 402A's author,
Dean Prosser, and of his Advisers on the Restatement project; contrary
to sound policy; and contrary to the developed jurisprudence on products
liability law over nearly forty years. Now that this quizzical little puzzle
has been solved, courts and commentators can return to the basic work
of applying the defect concepts properly without the distraction of an
apparent distortion at the center of products liability law.
